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THE STATE OF UTAH,
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vs.
ARCHIE L. LARSEN and LEE H.
WHITLOCK, a partnership,
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6240

Defendants,

LEE H. vVHITLOCK,
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appellant in his brief has stated the facts, and respondent will endeavor to avoid unnecessary repetition
of the same. However, in order to lay a factual foundation to our legal argument, we will here set forth that
portion of the facts we believe pertinent to this controversy.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A complaint was filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court by the State Tax Commission against Archie
L. Larsen and Lee H. Whitlock, a partnership, alleging
sales tax liability. In furtherance of said action, a summons was prepared by respondent and given to the
Sheriff of Salt Lake County for service. On the 24th day
of December, 1936, the original of the said summons, together with a certificate, duly executed and certified by
a deputy sheriff, was returned and filed with the clerk of
the court in Duchesne County. The certificate of the
sheriff certified that he had served the summons, together with a copy of the complaint, upon Lee H. Whitlock personally on the 17th day of December, 1936. Lee
H. Whitlock failed to answer the complaint of the respondent or otherwise plead, and on the 8th day of March,
1938, the default of Lee H. Whitlock was duly entered
by the clerk of the said court. On the 9th day of March,
1938, the Honorable Dallas H. Young rendered judgment
in favor of respondent and against appellant, Lee H.
Whitlock. In the judgment the court found Archie L.
Larsen and Lee H. Whitlock, individually, had been regularly served with process and had defaulted. On the
8th day of l\1arch, 1939, Lee H. Whitlock, by and through
his attorneys, Moyle and l\ioyle, filed the following motion:
"Now comes the defendant, Lee II. Whitlock,
by Moyle & Moyle, his attorneys, appearing here
specially for the purposes of this motion only, and
moves the court to vacate, set aside and quash the
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alleged or pretended service of summons upon this
defendant for the reason that summons in the
above entitled cause has never been served upon
this defendant.

''This motion is based upon the files and
records of said action and the proceedings therein
and upon the affidavit attached hereto, which affidavit is hereby referred to and made a part hereof.
''Please govern yourself accordingly.
(Signed) MOYLE & MOYLE,
Attorneys for Defendant Lee
H. Whitlock, for the purpose of
this motion only.

l

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.

"0. vV. MOYLE, JR., being first duly sworn,
upon oath deposes and certifies that he is one of
the attorneys for the defendant, Lee H. Whitlock,
for the purpose of the above motion only; that in
his opinion the objection to the pretended service
of summons upon said defendant as set forth in
the above motion is well taken.
(Signed)

0. W. MOYLE, JR.

''Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th
day of March, 1939.
(SEAL)
(Signed) DAN T. MOYLE,
Notary Public, residing at
Salt Lake County, Utah.
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''Received copy of the above motion, together
with the attached affidavit, this 8th day of March,
1939.
(Signed) ALFRED KLEIN,
Attorney for the State Tax
Commission of the State of
Utah.''
(Italics ours.)
This motion was supported by an affidavit filed hy
Mr. Whitlock. The motion was filed in the District Court
at Duchesne County on the 8th day of March, 1939. On
the day set for hearing of the said motion, respondent
appeared through its attorney and objected to the motion
on the ground that such a motion would not properly lie
after judgment and, hence, any evidence in support of
the motion was irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial.
The Honorable Abe W. Turner, Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court, before whom the matter was heard,
deferred ruling upon this objection and received the evidence introduced by the appellant. The admissibility of
the evidence was, of course, conditioned upon the ruling
on the objections interposed by the Tax Commission. The
Tax Commission, in turn, refused to submit any evidence, electing to stand upon its position that the motion
was entirely out of order and any evidence in support or
denial thereof was irrelevant. Judge Turner requested
briefs supporting the positions of the respective parties
regarding the efficacy of the motion. The briefs were
duly submitted~ and the court, on the 24th day of June,
1939, denied the motion. It is from the denial of this
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motion that the appellant, Lee H. Whitlock, instituted this
appeal.

Questions
As analyzed by respondent, there are two questions
presented to the Court by this appeal:
1. Is the order denying a restrictive motion to

quash service of summons an appealable order?
2. Will a motion restricting itself to the sole purpose of quashing service of summons properly
lie after judgment?
·

Argument
In presenting its negative answers to the two questions, respondent will divide its argument into the following subheads :
A. The denial by the district court of appellant's
restrictive motion to quash service of summons
is not a final judgment for the purpose of
appeal.
B. Appellant's restrictive motion to quash service
of summons, made after judgment, precluded
respondent from defending its judgment.
C. The dh;trict court, regardless of objections by
respondent, properly denied appellant's restrictive motion to quash service of summons.
D. Appellant's motion was not a direct attack
against the judgment.
E. Appellant's restrictive motion to quash service
of sun1mons, made after judgment, was neither
a proper nor allowable motion.
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A.
The Denial by the District Court of Appellant's
Restrictive Motion to Quash Service of
Summons Is not a Final Judgment
for the Purpose of Appeal.
The right of appeal is an absolute but limited right
guaranteed by the Constitution and Laws of the State of
Utah, which provide:
Article 8, Section 9, of the Constitution of the
State of Utah:
''From all final judgments of the district
courts, there shall be a right of appeal to thP Supreme Court. • * * ''
Section 104-41-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933:
''From all final judgments of the district
courts, except in certain cases specially provided
for originating in city courts and in justices'
courts, there shall be a right of appeal to the su. preme court. * * * Appeals shall also lie from the
final orders and decrees of the court in the administration of decedents' estates and in cases of
guardianship.''
This right of appeal exists only where expressly
given by constitutional or statutory provision and cannot
be extended. In the case of In re Jones' Estate, (1920)
56 Utah 291, 190 Pac. 783, the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah, speaking through Chief Justice Corfman,
said:
''No express provision is made in our Code of
Civil Proce_du~e giving a right of appeal from an
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order appointing a special administrator, nor do
we think any such right was intended or may be
reasonably implied from the reading of the foregoing constitutional or statutory provisions. The
right of appeal does not exist unless given by
constitutional or statutory authority, expressed
or necessarily implied. Woerner, Am. Law of
Adm., ( 2d Ed.) Sec. 543, p. 1192; Golding v. J ennings, 1 Utah 135; Benson v. Anderson, 9 Utah
15-1, 33 Pac. 691 ; In re Carpenter, 73 Cal. 203,
14 Pac. 677. * * * To hold otherwise than that no
appeal lies from such an appointive order would
nullify and render ineffective the manifest intent
and purpose of the Legislature by its enactment."
Substantially the same holding was made by the
Supreme Court of Utah in the following cases: Castle
Dale City v. Woolley ( 1923), 61 Utah 291, 212 Pac. 1111;
State v. Olsen (1911), 39 Utah 177,115 Pac. 968; State v.
Kelsey (1924), 64 Utah 377, 231 Pac. 122.
While the right to appeal cannot be extended beyond
constitutional or statutory mandate, the question as to
what are final judgments, as that term is used in the
Constitution and Laws of the State of Utah and most
other states, is not so well settled. In Volume 2 of
American Jurispntdence, Pages 858, 860, 861 and 862, it
is stated:
''At common law error lies only from a final
judgment. This general requirement of finality
has been carried into the statutes regulating
review proceedings; and it may be. stated generally that a judgment, decree, or order, to be appealable, must be final or in the nature of a final
decision. ,. . . . *
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''A judgment, order, or decree, to be final for
purposes of an appeal or error, must dispose of
the cause, or a distinct branch thereof, as to all
the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future determination. It must finally
dispose of the whole subject-matter or be a termination of the particular proceedings or action,
leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. In other words,
a final judgment is one which operates to divest
some right in such a manner as to put it beyond
the power of the court making the order to place
the parties in their original condition after the
expiration of the term; that is, it must put the
case out of court, and must be final in all matters
within the pleadings.''
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has at
various times had occasion to pass upon the question as
to what are and what are not appealable orders within
the meaning of our Constitution and statutes. In the
case of Shurtz v. Thorley, et al. ( 1936), 90 Utah 381, 61
Pac. (2d) 1262, the Supreme Court of this state reviewed
the prior decisions of the court which had defined or
passed upon the meaning of the term ''all final judgments
of the District Courts.'' In the course of the opinion by
Mr. Justice Folland, it was stated:
''After the adoption of the Constitution, this
court defined the phrase 'final judgment' in the
case of North Point Consolidated Irr. Co. v. Utah
& Salt Lake Canal Co., supra, as follows (holding
an order granting temporary injunction not a
final judgment): 'The word "final" or "final
judgment'' has a plain meaning. A judgment, to
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
be final, must dispose of the case as to all the
parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter
of the litigation on the merits of the case. Champ
v. Kendrick, (130 Ind. 545) 30 N. E. 635. Bouvier
defines a final judgment as used in opposition to
interlocutory as "A final judgment is a judgment
which ends the controversy between the parties
litigant.'' ''The general rule recognized by the
courts of the United States and by the courts of
most, if not all, of the States, is that no judgment
or decree will be regarded as final, within the
meaning of the statutes in reference to appeals,
unless all the issues of law and of fact necessary to
be determined were determined and the case completely disposed of, so far as the court had power
to dispose of it." Freem. Judgm. Sec. 34.' (Italics
supplied.)
"Notwithstanding what was there said about
the words 'final judgment' having a plain meaning, this court has had some difficulty in fitting the
definition given to the varying circumstances
shown in the many cases coming before it. The
following orders of the district courts have been
held not to be final or appealable judgments:
Granting injunction pendente lite, North Point
Consolidated Irr. Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal
Co., supra; granting motion for a new trial, Eastman v. Gurrey, supra; overruling motion for a
new trial, White v. Pease, 15 Utah 170, 49 P. 416;
Nelson v. Southern Pac. Co., 15 Utah 325, 49 P.
644; appointing receiver pendente lite, Popp v.
Daisy Gold-Min. Co., 22 Utah 457, 63 P. 185;
United States v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints, 5 Utah 394, 16 P. 723; Oldroyd v. :McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 P. 580, 588, 40 A. L. R. 230 ;
for temporary alimony and suit money, In re
Kelsey, 12 Utah 393, 43 P. 106; for an accounting,
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Standard Steam Laundry v. Dole, 20 Utah 469,
58 P. 1109 ; quashing service of summons, Honerine Min. & Mill. Co. v. Tallerday Steel Pipe &
Tank Co., 30 Utah 449, 85 P. 626; granting nonsuit where not followed by judgment of dis1nissal,
Rocky Mountain Stud Farm Co. v. Lunt, 46 Utah
299, 151 P. 521; verdict of jury without proper
judgment, Kourbetis v. National Copper Bank of
Salt Lake City, 71 Utah 232, 264 P. 724; awarding
possession of exhibit after judgment, Omega Inv.
Co. v. Woolley, 75 Utah 274, 284 Pac. 523.
''The following orders or judgments have
been held final judgments for purposes of appeal:
Discharging petitioner of habeas corpus, Winnovich v. Emery, 33 Utah 345, 93 P. 988; quashing
garnishment and releasing garnishee, Bristol v.
Brent, 35 Utah 213, 99 P. 1000; dismissing action
after sustaining motion for nonsuit, Robinson v.
Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 520, 109 P. 817; 'Interlocutory decree' in divorce cases, Parsons v. Parsons, 40 Utah 602, 122 P. 907; ordering delivery
of property and accounting for interest, Wheelwright v. Roman, 50 Utah 10, 165 P. 513; for condemnation of part only of property without assessment of damages, Ketchum Coal Co. v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 50 Utah 395, 168 P. 86, 89;
decree of partnership, Benson v. Rozzelle, 85 Utah
582, 39 P. (2d) 1113; dismissal of petition to set
aside probate proceedings after discharge of adIninistrator, In re Phillips' Estate, 86 Utah 358,
44 P. (2d) 699; decree of water rights as between
certain parties in general water adjudication,
Plain City Irr. Co. v. IIooper Irr. Co., 87 Utah
545, 51 P. (2d) 1069, 1076."
In the case of Attorney General of Utah v. Pomeroy
{1937 ), 93 Utah 426, 73 Pac. (2d) 1277, the Supreme Court
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of this state, speaking through Mr. Justice Wolfe, cited
the above-mentioned case as the oldest case on this point
in this jurisdiction and proceeded to quote the first cited
paragraph as the court's definition of "final judgment."
Another pertinent statement from this decision is as
follows:
''And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that
an appeal from what constitutes a finding merely
as compared to a judgment which actually adjudicates the rights of the parties is not appealable.
Thus, an appeal from a verdict where judgment
has not been entered. Kourbetis v. National Copper Bank~ 71 Utah 232, 264 P. 724. Nor from an
order for judgment, Ellinwood v. Bennion, 73
Utah 563, 276 P. 159. Nor from a minute order
dismissing appeal. Robinson v. Fillmore Commercial & Sav. Bank, 61 Utah 398, 213 P. 790. Nor
where order for but not judgment of dismissal is
entered. Lukish v. Utah Const. Co., 46 Utah 317,
150 P. 298; Watson v. Odell, 53 Utah 96, 176 P.
619. Nor from an order quashing summons without dismissing the action. Honerine Min. & Mill
Co. v. Tallerday Steel Pipe & Tank Co., 30 Utah
449, 85 P. 626. Nor from an order denying a motion to correct a judgment. Cullen v. Harris, 27
Utah 4~ 73 P. 1048."
A careful analysis of the cases appears to us to indicate that the obvious intent of the Constitution and Laws
of the State of Utah, cited supra, as well as the common
law rules from which they arose, is simply that a litigant
must exhaust his procedural remedies in a lower court
and thereby finally dispose of the matter there before
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requesting a review by the Supreme Court. In short,
the lower court must have irretrievably placed the litigant in a position where his only logical remedy is to
appeal for a reversal or modification by a higher tribunal.
Justice Wolfe, in the cited portion of the opinion in the
Pomeroy case, quotes from the case of North Point Consolidated Irrigation Company v. Utah & 8. L. Canal Company (1896), 14 Utah 155, 46 Pac. 824. Particular attention is respectfully directed to that portion of the quotation which reads :
''A judgment, to be final, must dispose of the
case as to all parties, and finally dispose of the
subject matter of the litigation on the merits of
the case.''
Certainly, an order denying the motion to quash service of summons does not dispose of the case upon its
merits. In the immediate controversy, the appellant was
not left without further remedies in the district court by
the order of the court denying his motion to quash service
of summons. All that was necessary was that he amend
his motion to one praying for an order vacating the
judgment because of lack of jurisdiction or because of
defective service. The order could have readily been
made restrictive in that regard. It is very possible that
the amendment could even have been effected by interlineation. In any event, the further proceeding that
could have been taken was obvious.
Proceeding from these well settled and unquestioned
principles, the immediate question arises-Is the denial
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of the restrictive motion of the appellant to quash service
of summons an appealable order1 This identical question has been raised and considered by the supreme courts
of other jurisdictions, and recognized legal commentators have commented on the same.
In the case of Klepper v. Klepper (1928), 51 Nev.
145, 271 Pac. 336, the Supreme Court of the State of
Nevada was confronted with the following situation:
Plaintiff instituted a suit for divorce. She filed an affidavit of nonresidence of the defendant and had service
made upon him personally in a sister state. Defendant
appeared specially and moved to quash the service on
jurisdictional grounds. This was denied, and as defendant did not plead further, judgment was taken against
him by default. Defendant appealed and the court held:
''Section 5329, Rev. Laws, as amended ( Stats.
1913, p. 113), provides when an appeal may be
taken, and no appeal can be taxen except when
authorized by statute. Nowhere does our statute
provide that an appeal may be taken from an
order denying a motion to quash a summons, or
the service thereof; hence it is clear that the
defendant had no right of appeal from the order
in question.''
This case appears to us to be even stronger than the
one confronting this Court. The laws of Nevada provide
that an appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken by
the defendant as a matter of right from any judgment
against him; from a final judgment of conviction; from
an order denying a motion for a new trial; and from
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an order made after judgment affecting the substantial
rights of the party. It would seem these provisions give
a right of appeal in situations that are not covered by the
Utah Constitution and statutes, supra, and hence are much
broader than our own laws.
In the case of Ryan v. Davenport (1894), 5 S.D. 203,
58 N. W. 568, the Supreme Court of the State of South
Dakota considered this problem. In this case, the appeal
was from an order of the Circuit Court denying a motion
to set aside the service of summons as irregular and void.
Respondent's counsel moved to dismiss the appeal from
the court on the grounds that no appeal will lie from an
order denying the motion to set aside the service of
summons. The court, in upholding the position taken by
respondent, said in the course of its opinion:
'' 'The following orders when made by the court
may be carried to the supreme court: 1, An order
affecting a substantial right made in any action,
when such order in effect determines the action
and prevents a judgment from which an appeal
might be taken. 2, A final order affecting a substantial right made in special proceedings, or upon
a summary application in an action after judgment. 3, * * *. 4, When it involves the merits of
the action or some part thereof. * * *' Unless the
order comes within one of the above provisions,
no appeal will lie. An order setting aside the
service of the summons would have affected a
substantial right, as such order would, in effect,
determine the action, and prevent a judgment
from which an appeal might be taken. The effect
of this order is not to determine the action and
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prevent a judgment; nor is it in a special proceeding, nor upon a summary application in an
action after judgment; neither does it involve the
merits of the action, or any part thereof. Orton
v. K oonan, 32 Wis. 104; Rahn v. Gunnison, 12
\Vis. 528. The overruling of an objection made
to the jurisdiction of a court, or the denial of a
motion to set aside the service of a summons on
jurisdictional grounds, is not a final order affecting a substantial right, and is not appealable under the provisions of our statute, nor reviewable
in this court before the entry of final judgment.
An order that involves the merits of an action is
one that goes to its substance or subject-matter,
and affects the justice of the cause; and it cannot be said that the order from which this appeal
is taken is of that character. The appeal is dismissed.''
In the case of Salmons v. Rugyeri (1927 ), 103 N. J.
Law 596, 137 Atl. 568, the Court of Errors and Appeals
of the State of New Jersey passed upon this question. In
this case, the court held that an order overruling a
motion to strike out return to summons and to quash the
writ was not a final judgment that entitled defendant to
appeal therefrom. The court said in this regard:
''Here the order was simply 011e overruling
a motion to strike out the return to· a summons
and to quash the writ. It was a 1nere interlocutory
order. The defendant should have filed an answer
on the merits as directed by l\Ir. Justice Trenchard, and gone to trial. He had protected himself,
upon the reeunl, as to the question which he
raised, could have raised it again on the trial, and,
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gued the invalidity of the service, as well as any
other matter, or he could have stayed away and
reviewed by appeal a judgment by default, which is
what the defendant did in Pizzutti v. Wuchter."
Bancroft, in his work on "Code Practice and Remedies," Vol. 8, Page 8387, Section 6322, states :
''Where a motion to quash the summons for
irregularity is overruled, the case is in no sense
finally disposed .of, and such an order is not of
itself appealable. So, also, it has been held that
where the summons has simply been quashed without an order of dismissal, an appeal will not lie;
but in some cases, an order quashing the summons
has not been held to be appealable."
In the same volume, Page 8388, Section 6323, Bancroft goes on to state :
''In most jurisdictions, an order either sustaining or refusing a motion to set aside service of
summons is not appealable, regardless of whether
the service has been made personally or by publication. An order quashing service is not a final
judgment, but leaves the action pending with the
right in the plaintiff to sue out an alias summons.''
In Brancroft's "Code Pleading Practice and Remedies," Ten-Year Supplement, Vol. 5, Page 4074, Section
6323, it is stated:
''An order denying a motion to quash the
summons and the service thereof is not appealable. But in Washington an appeal will lie from
an order sustaining the motion if it has the effect
of determining the action.''
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Our investigation has disclosed no case in Utah precisely on this point. The Supreme Court of the State of
Utah has, however, passed upon a situation which, in
our opinion, substantiates the position we have taken
as fully as if the case were directly in point. This case
is Honerine Mining & Milling Co., et al., v. Tallerday
Steel Pipe & Tank Co., et al., (1906 ), 30 Utah 449
85 Pac. 626. In this case an appeal was taken from an
order made by the district court quashing the service of
summons. The defendant appeared specially and moved
to quash the service upon the ground that it was not
made upon the proper person. His motion was granted.
On appeal the defendant argued that the order was not a
final judgment within the meaning of the statute or the
constitution and was, therefore, not appealable. The
court held this point was well taken. In the course of the
unanimous opinion of the court, written by Mr. Justice
Straup, it was stated:
"• • • the Utah statute gives the right of an
appeal only from a final judgment. From what has
been said by this court in prior cases, where the
question as to what is a final judgment within the
meaning of the statute was considered, this order
cannot be regarded as a final judgment. North
Point Irr. Co. v. Utah Canal Co., 14 Utah 155, 46
Pac. 824; Eastman v. Gurrey, 14 Utah 169, 46 Pac.
828; Watson v. Mayberry, 15 Utah 265, 49 Pac.
479; Laundty Co. v. Dole, 20 Utah 469, 58 Pac.
1109; Popp v. :\lin. Co., 22 Utah 460, 63 Pac. 185.
* * * vVhile plaintiff is here seeking to have deterrnined that it has the defendant in court upon
the process served, it may, at the same time, also
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apply for and obtain an alias summons from the
district court with which it may serve the defendant and bring it in."
This same contingency that was considered by Mr.
Justice Straup in the cited case is possible in the present
controversy. There was nothing to prevent the appellant from entering a special appearance in the district
court on a motion to vacate the judgment because of improper service of summons. We submit it is an inescapable aphorism that if the Constitution and Laws of
Utah do not permit an appeal from an order quashing
a service of summons, they will not authorize an appeal
from an order denying such a motion.
The only question, as we interpret the situation, that
arises i3 whether or not the fact that the restrictive
motion of appellant to quash the service of summons
was made after a default judgment had been entered
should alter the well settled rule presented. We maintain
in the present situation that this fact should not result
in a modification of or different holding from the rule
expressed by the cited cases and commentators. Appellant has urged in his brief that his motion must be considered as one directed to the vacating of a judgment
because of a void service of summons. We are at a complete loss to understand how this position can possibly
be taken. The motion, by its own terms, restricts its
attack to the service of process and eliminates thereby
any consideration of the judgment. In short, by the
terms of the motion, both the trial court and respondent
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were powerless to even look to the judgment but were
forced to direct their entire attention to the alleged void
service. vVe submit that both by common law and the
constitutional and statutory provisions of most of the
states, including the State of Utah, it is conclusively
shown that the order appealed from is not an appealable
order.

B.
Appellant's Restrictive Motion to Quash Service
of Summons, Made After Judgment,
Precluded Respondent from
Defending Its Judgment.
At the risk of belaboring the obvious, respondent will
endeavor to present to the Court the impossible position
in which it was placed by appellant's motion.
The record, upon its face, established a valid service
of summons. In light of this and additional facts, respondent in good faith took its judgment. Appellant
then proceeded to request relief by his restrictive motion to quash the service of summons. Appellant was
apparently proceeding under the theory that if he could
destroy the foundation of the judgment, to wit, the service of summons, the judgment must fall of its own weight.
In order to present the equities of the matter to the
court and to defend itself against this indirect attack
against the judgment, respondent should have been entitled to present any facts that would sustain its judgment, even assuming appellant had been able to maintain
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the position he had taken to the effect that at the inception of the action there was a void or defective service
of summons. The form and substance of the motion
makes it clear that the attack was not against the judgment as such, but was confined to an attack against the
service of process. The validity or merits of the judgment, or any of the facts or proceedings subsequent to
the service of process, were not raised in the motion, the
affidavit in support thereof, or in the oral evidence introduced at the hearing. Proof of the fact that the appellant entered an appearance either in person or by
counsel would be sufficient to sustain the judgment, even
though no service had been made. Laches or inexcusable
neglect on the part of the appellant in moving to set
aside the judgment may well have justified the court in
refusing to set the same aside.
A few of the multitudinous cases supporting this position are as follows: Hunter v. May (1930 ), 161 Tenn.
155,25 S. W. (2d) 580; Selmer v. Smith (1926), 285 Pa. 67~
131 Atl. 663; Vaughn v. Pine Creek Tungsten Company
(1928), 89 Cal. App. 759, 265 Pac. 491.
The form and contents of the appellant's motion expressly precluded respondent from defending its judgment on any of these grounds, and, likewise, limited
the court's consideration only to the alleged void service.
In Volume 20 of American Juris prudence, Page
242, Section 248, it is stated:
"It is fundamental that evidence to be admissible must relate and be confined to the matter
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or matters in issue in the case at bar and must
tend to prove or disprove these matters or be
pertinent thereto, or, to put it another way, the
proof must correspond to the issues raised by the
pleadings. This rule excludes evidence of collateral facts or those which are incapable of affording any reasonable presumption or inference
as to the principal fact or matter in disputethose which are remote, collateral, and irrelevant.''
At Page 278, Section 302, same authority and vol- ·
ume, it is stated:
"The fundamental principle is that evidence
must be relevant to the facts in issue in the case
on trial and tend to prove or disprove such facts;
evidence as to collateral facts is not admissible."
It must be remembered that appellant's restrictive
motion was directed entirely and exclusively to the alleged void service of summons and in no way was directed to the validity of the judgment itself. It is selfapparent that the procedure taken by appellant placed
respondent in a position that was not only unreasonable
but was manifestly unfair and inequitable. Appellant in
his brief has argued that respondent permitted the appellant to conclusively prove and establish that the court
was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment. An examination of the record discloses this is not the fact. Respondent objected to any testimony being offered in
rupport of appellant's motion upon the grounds that the
motion itself was improper and any evidence taken in
support of the same was irrelevant and immaterial.
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Appellant further contends that respondent did not offer
any evidence to support the validity of its judgment. It
appears to us rather anomalous that appellant takes this
position, in view of the fact that by the express terms
of his motion he precluded respondent from offering any
such evidence. Appellant states in his brief that his
motion was for the purpose of attacking the validity of
the judgment to the end that the judgment would be
declared invalid. We submit that such being the fact,
appellant's restrictive motion to quash service of summons, made after judgment, placed respondent in an impossible position and one not calculated to fully and
impartially present the pertinent facts of the controversy
to the court. In light of this, it was not only the right
but the duty of the trial court to deny the motion.

c.
The District Court, Regardless of Objections by
Respondent, Properly Denied Appellant's
Restrictive Motion to Quash
Service of Summons.
Appellant in his brief argues that the plaintiff did
not file a reply or denial of any kind to the sworn affidavit
of the appellant and intimates that the objections made
by respondent were not sufficient to justify the court in
its holding. We believe the objections made by respondent, or the form thereof, are entirely immaterial. If the
motion of the appellant to quash service of summons,
made after judgment, was a valid and allowable motion,
it should have been granted regardless of any objections
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made by respondent. On the other hand, if the motion
was not a permissible motion, the trial court should have
denied the same regardless of objections or lack of objections on the part of respondent. To go even a step
further, if the motion made by appellant was injudicious,
the trial court should have denied the same even though
its allowance was urged by both the appellant and respondent. We submit that inasmuch as appellant's motion was, in light of the facts, injudicious and improper,
the court not only had the discretion but the duty to
deny the same.

D.
Appellant's Motion Was not a Direct Attack
Against the Judgment.
At the outset of our presentation, in furtherance
with Point D, we desire clearly to define our position. We
believe appellant's motion to quash service of process,
restricting itself to that purpose and nothing more, will
not lie when made after judgment. We further maintain that the propriety of such a motion is in no way
affected by a determination that the motion is a direct
or collateral attack against the judgment. In any event,
a motion, such as the one made by appellant, should not
be granted. Appellant has, however, directed a considerable portion of his brief to the proposition that his motion
was a direct attack against the judgment, as distinguished
from a collateral attack. Assuming, without admitting,
that the question of direct and collateral attack in relation
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to this controversy is material, we cannot agree that this
motion was a direct attack against the judgment.
It is interesting to note that nowhere in the motion
is there any reference made to the merits of the action or
the judgment. In fact, the term ''judgment'' is not even
used.

To refer briefly to the record, there is nothing to indicate that the service of summons was not legally and
effectively made. It is only by evidence dehors the record
that any contrary position can be taken.
Many courts, including the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah, have passed upon the efficacy of direct and
collateral attacks against judgments. The holdings have
been almost as varied as the number of courts passing
upon this question. It is practically impossible to lay
down any general rules or principles in regard to direct
and collateral attacks against judgments. Some of the
leading cases, however, in our opinion show a decided
trend to a rule that evidence dehors the record is inadmissible to impeach a judgment legal on its face. In this
regard we direct the Court to Globe Construction Co. v.
Yost ( 1932), 169 Wash. 319, 13 Pac. (2d) 433; Green v.
Craig {1932), 164 Tenn. 445, 51 S. W. (2d) 480; Levinson
v. Vanderveer (1932), 169 Wash. 254, 13 Pac. (2d) 448.
Courts have many times held that final decrees and
judgments are not open to collateral attacks.

Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford and Cantrell
. (1931), 164 Tenn. 107,47 S. W. (2d) 558;
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Producers' Refining Company v. Missouri K. tt T.
R. Co. of Texas, (Tex.) 13 S. W. (2d) 679;
Amy v. Amy (1895), 12 Utah 278, 42 Pac. 1121.
What constitutes a collateral attack, as distinguished
from a direct attack, is, as stated, by no means settled.
It would seem, however, that many of the better reasoned
cases hold that where a judgment is not void on its face,
it is not subject to a collateral attack.

Dockery v. Central Arizona Light & Power Company (1935), 45 Ariz. 434,45 Pac. (2d) 656;
In re Fort Shaw Irrigation District ( 1927), 81
~font. 170, 261 Pac. 962;
Coburn v. Coburn (1931), 89 Mont. 386, 298 Pac.
349;
Bird v. Palmer (1931), 152 Olda. 3 and 7, 3 Pac.
(2d) 890 and 894;
Protest of St. Louis- S. F. Railway Co. (1933),
163 Okla. 1, 19 Pac. (2d) 162;
Wise v. Miller (1927), 215 Ala. 660, 111 So. 913;
Florence Gin Company v. City of Florence (1933),
226 Ala. 478, 147 So. 417;
Lambie v. W. T. Rawleigh Company (1929 ), 178
Ark. 1019, 14 S. W. (2d) 245.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah, in the
case of Intermill v. Nash (1938), 94 Utah 271, 75 Pac.
(2d) 157, passed upon this question. Appellant has cited
this case as authority for the position he has taken. We
believe the case stands for the exact opposite of his
position and, therefore, will endeavor to analyze the
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decision. The facts of the case are, briefly, as follows:
The plaintiff instituted a suit against the defendant to
quiet her title to real estate located in Salt Lake City.
Defendant answered, denying plaintiff's allegations, and
in a counterclaim, alleged title in herself. Plaintiff filed
an answer to defendant's counterclaim. The answer to
the counterclaim alleged that plaintiff had bought the
land in question from Hoffman Brothers, and that subsequent to her acquiring the land, one Lulu B. Burrows
had brought an action in the district court against Hoffman and others, including the plaintiff, to foreclose a
mortgage given by Hoffman Brothers. The plaintiff
further alleged she was not properly served in the prior
action as the only service made was by publication and
there was no affidavit of jurisdictional facts authorizing
such service of summons. Plaintiff, therefore, had defaulted and a judgment of foreclosure had been entered
and a sale of the property made to Lulu B. Burrows,
which thereby created a cloud on the plaintiff's title; the
plaintiff, therefore, prayed the court to vacate and set
aside the pretended judgment and thereby remove the
said cloud upon her title. The trial court excluded any
evidence tending to show that the service upon the plaintiff in the foreclosure action was bad. The court's reason
for so holding was that the evidence constituted a collateral attack against the judgment in foreclosure and
hence was inadmissible. From this ruling plaintiff appealed.
Mr. Justice Larson, in upholding the decision of the
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laterally attacked, even though the ground for the attack
be a void service of process, said in the course of his
opinion:
''A direct attack is an action or motion for the
specific and primary purpose of setting aside or
annulling the judgment; and any action which has
for its purpose the accomplishment of any other
relief than the setting aside or modifying of the
judgment is not a direct attack. Wayne v. Brimley, 190 Ky. 488, 227 S. W. 996. When the direct
purpose and aim of the proceeding is to attain
relief other than the setting aside or modifying of
the judgment, and the attack upon the judgment
is involved merely incidentally, the attack is collateral." (Italics ours.)
It is difficult to conceive that a motion limiting itself
to a request to quash service of summons without any
mention or reference made to the judgment can be said
to be ''a motion for the specific and primary purpose of
setting aside or annulling the judgment.'' On the question of quashing service of summons, Mr. Justice Larson
further clarifies the position of the court when he quotes
with approval from the case of Morrill v. Morrill ( 1890),
20 Ore. 96, 25 Pac. 362, which held :
" 'An attempt to impeach the decree in a proceeding not instituted for the express purpose of
annulling, correcting, or modifying the decree or
enjoining its execution' is a collateral attack."
(Italics ours.)
To refer again to appellant's motion, it is apparent
on its face that its express purpose is to quash service of
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summons and not to vacate, annul or correct the judgment. The opinion of Mr. Justice Larson goes on to
state in regard to direct and collateral attacks:
"The terms 'direct' and 'collateral,' as used in
reference to attacks on judgments, apply to the
purpose of, or the method employed in, the attack,
and not as descriptive of the assault itself. The
term 'direct attack' means a proceeding brought,
instituted, or maintained directly for the purpose,
that is, with the direct and primary objective, of
modifying, setting aside, cancelling or vacating,
or enjoining the enforcement of the judgment. The
term 'collateral attack' means the questioning of
the validity of a judgment in a collateral proceeding; that is, a proceeding other than the one in
which the judgment is entered, and which is not
brought, instituted, or maintained for the express
purpose of modifying, setting aside, canceling, or
enjoining the execution of the judgment. It is a
denial of, or questioning the validity of, a judgment, when the judgment is or becomes involved in
the cause, only incidentally and collaterally, and
its enforcement or validity is not the primary
issue in or purpose of the proceeding." (Italics
ours.)
Mr. Justice Wolfe, in his concurring opinion in the
case of lntermill v. Nash, says:
''There have been many confusing statements
as to direct and collateral attacks on judgments.
We are interested more in the manner of testing
in any given case whether a judgment may be
attacked than in nomenclature. As says the
prevailing opinion, generally, a direct attack is one
the. purpose of which is to eliminate what is o.r
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purports to be a judgment, whereas a collateral
attack atten1pts not to obliterate the judgment, but
to avoid the effect of it when used in another suit.
But I think there is a form of direct attack which
really only avoids the effect of a purported judgment. In order to make this more clear, I list the
types of direct attacks as I see them: (1) That
attack which attempts to set aside a judgment by
a motion or proceeding brought in the same suit in
which the judgment was rendered. (2) A separate suit brought and designed directly to set aside
a voidable judgment or what is not a judgment
but which purports to be one; in other words, a
void judgment. (3) Where a party brings a suit
or defends a suit relying for recovery or for a
defense on what purports to be a judgment rendered in another suit, the opposing party may
show such judgment to be void.''
l\Ir. Justice Wolfe explains his position even more
fully at the end of his opinion, when he states:
"At least in this case it was necessary to go outside of the judgment roll by the introduction in
evidence of an affidavit of jurisdictional facts
claimed to be deficient in order to prove the judgment void. This could not be done without such
pleadings as would be required in an independent
action to set the judgment aside." (Italics ours.)
To adopt the proceeding designated by Mr. Justice
Wolfe in his opinion, it certainly cannot be contended in
the present controversy with any degree of logic or
reason that a motion limiting itself to a request for the
quashing of a service of sum1nons can be said to be ''such
pleadings as would be required in an independent action
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to set the judgment aside.'' An analytical examination
of the cited case fails, in our opinion, to give any support
to the position taken by appellant. In fact, the case clearly stands for the contrary to his position.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has in
other cases clearly held that a collateral or indirect attack
against a judgment, fair and proper on its face, is not
permissible. In the case of Amy v. Amy, supra, the court
said:
"We think that the court having found, judicially that service was legally made upon the defendant Butterworth, in this collateral proceeding recourse could not be had to the files in the
case, aside from the judgment roll, and that no evidence would be admissible other than that contained in the judgment roll dehors the recital in
the judgment." (Italics the court's.)
This ruling was reiterated and clearly established in
the case of Intermill v. Nash, supra, when the court held
at Page 278 of 94 Utah:
''A judgment, once entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, having the res and the parties
duly brought before it as provided by law, imports
verity, proves itself, and is invulnerable to attacks
by any indirect assaults. It can only be questioned
in the manner and the proceedings established by
law. And since a judgment is established and
proved by the record thereof, unless an inspection
of that record establishes its invalidity, shows it to
be void, the judgment is conclusive and may not
be questioned collaterally by any matters dehors
the record thereof. Amy v. Amy, 12 Utah 278, 42
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P.1121, 112-l:; Hoagland v. Hoagland, 19 Utah 103,
57 P. 20; Liebhart v. Lawrence, 40 Utah 243, 120
P. 215."
In light of the foregoing authorities, it is our position
that appellant's motion, if it can be classified as either,
was a collateral or indirect attack against the judgment
and, therefore, not permissible under the laws of the State
of Utah.

E.
Appellant's Restrictive Motion to Quash Service
of Summons, Made After Judgment, Was
Neither a Proper Nor Allowable Motion.
Regardless of whether or not the attack attempted
to be made by appellant was collateral or direct, the
courts have uniformly held that such a motion as filed
by the appellant in the present controversy is not permissible after judgment.
In the case of Gregg v. Seawell (1922), 85 Okla. 88,
204 Pac. 908, a motion to quash the service of summons
in the action was filed on the 27th day of August, 1918,
several days after the rendition of the judgment in the
action. The court said :
"The plaintiffs in error have cited no authority in their brief authorizing them to move to
quash the service of a summons after the court
has tried the cause and rendered judg1nent. It is
obvious that such a snmn1ary proceeding is in
effect an attack upon the judgment of the court at
least to the extent that the judgment adjudicated
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that the service of the summons was regular and
effectual to vest the court with jurisdiction to
adjudicate the issues involved in the action. The
plaintiffs in error in their motion to quash the
service of summons in no way challenged the correctness of the judgment rendered in the cause
upon any grounds.
"We conclude that the plaintiffs in error in
this cause cannot in a summary manner have adjudicated the jurisdictional facts which were adjudicated by the judgment of the trial court that
entered the judgment in the original action. We
do not want to be understood as passing upon the
validity of the service of a summons served by
an attorney of record in an action, as we deem it
unnecessary in view of our conclusions herein to
pass upon that question. We conclude that a motion to quash summons after judgment is unauthorized by law, as such a motion is only properly filed prior to the rendition of judgment.''
In the case of Dannenburg v. Powers (1938), 182
Okla. 404, 77 Pac. (2d) 1142, the same result was reached
by the court when the plaintiff, after judgment had been
taken against him by default and after execution was
issued and returned ''nothing found,'' filed a motion to
quash the service of summons. The court held:
"We hold that a motion to quash a summons, filed
after judgment has been rendered, is not a proper
method of attacking the validity of the summons."
In the case of Baldwin v. Burt (1898}, 54 Neb. 287,
74 N. W. 594, the court held that, after the entry of a
decree, upon the showing that no service of the summons
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upon which the decree was based had, in fact, been made,
it was erroneous to quash such summons upon a motion
asking solely for that order.
In the case of Producers' Naval Stores Company v.
Brewton, (Ga. 1916), 90S. E. 735, the court had before it
the question of a defective service and in the course of
its opinion said :
''Objections to the return of a Deputy Sheriff
which shows legal service on a defendant must be
raised before judgment, by a plea in abatement,
and in connection therewith the return must be
duly traversed, and both the Sheriff and the Deputy Sheriff are necessary parties to the traverse.
''When the record shows a valid return of
service, and it is necessary to resort to extrinsic
testimony to show that there has been no service,
or that the service was for any reason invalid, the
objection can be made only by plea in abatement
(if before judgment), and in connection therewith
the sheriff's return must be duly traversed.''
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has, in
our opi~ion, clearly intimated that the proper procedure
for vacating or setting aside a judgment is by a motion
to set aside and vacate the judgment.
In the case of Madsen v. Hodson (1927 ), 69 Utah
527, 256 Pac. 792, the court said :
"To obtain relief against a default judgment, the
proper practice is not by motion for a new trial,
but by a motion to set aside and vacate the judgment. Thomas v. Morris, 8 Utah 284,31 Pac. 446.''
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A study of appellant's brief fails to disclose one
authority in favor of the position he has taken. The case
~most relied upon, and cited by appellant as the leading
and most cited case on the question, is that of Norton v.
Atchison, etc., Railroad Company {1893), 97 Cal. 388, 32
Pac. 452. An examination of this case indicates, if anything, that the decision is against appellant's position
rather than in support thereof. In the Atchison case,
after the entry of judgment, the defendant filed a motion
to quash the service of summons to set aside and vacate
the default of the defendant and to set aside and vacate
the judgment which had been entered in the case in favor
of the plaintiff. It is obvious in this case that the entire
proceedings, including the judgment, were brought before
the court by the motion filed by the defendant. The plaintiff had a right under the pleadings to defend his judgment in any legitimate manner he could, independent of a
defective service of process at the inception of the action.
In fact, respondent's principal objection to appellant's
motion and any evidence introduced in support thereof
in the case at bar was due to the fact that the appellant
failed to do the very thing that was done in the Atchison
ease.
Appellant also cites the case of Baldwin v. Burt,
supra, in support of his position. Any question as to
what this authority stands for was settled by the court
in its own syllabus of the holding of the case. In the syllabus the court states:
"After the entry of a decree, upon a showing
that no service of the summons upon which the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
cree was based had in fact been n1ade, it was
erroneous to quash such summons upon a motion
asking solely for that order." (Italics ours.)
\Ve respectfully submit that a reading of the authorities upon this question clearly indicates that the unanimous opinion of the courts who have passed upon the
problem is that a motion asking solely for an order quashing service of summons, after judgment, is not a permissible nor allowable motion. Respondent, after a careful
search, has been able to find not one authority to the contrary of this position, nor has appellant cited any in his
brief.
It was not the opinion of the respondent herein that,
providing the appellant could establish that the judgment
against him was invalid and void, he could have no relief
therefrom. Assuming the facts as stated by the appellant,
which, however, respondent does not admit, the Legislature of Utah has seen fit to give a fair and equitable remedy. This remedy is fair to both parties to the action and
was certainly available to the appellant at the time he
brought his motion to quash the service of process. The
remedy referred to is found in Section 104-14-4, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, which, among other things, provides:
"When, from any cause, the summons in an action
has not been personally served on the defendant,
the court may allow, on such terms as may be just,
such defendant or his legal representative, at anv
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Inent in such action, to answer to the merits of the
original action. Nothing but the actual, taxable
costs of the action accruing on and after the default, not including attorneys' fees, shall be imposed by the court under the provisions of this
section authorizing the imposition of terms as a
condition upon which relief is granted.''
The equity of such a statute is self-evident. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that, as appellant contends,
no service was made, neither of the parties to the action
could be injured. To further assume, for the sake of
argument, that appellant is allowed to destroy a judgment in the indirect way he has attempted, and without
regard to the Utah statutes, the reasoning behind the
quoted section of the statute would be circumvented. A
plaintiff, who in good faith had taken the judgment which
was fair and proper on its face, might be barred by the
statute of limitations from his legal remedy when a defendant saw fit to raise the objection to the service of
summons.
'rhe case of The Blyth ct Fargo Company v. Swenson
{1897 ), 15 Utah 345, 49 Pac. 1027, is enlightening in regard to the quoted section of the Utah statutes. In this
case, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendants in
their individual names on two promissory notes. Personal service was made on part of the defendants but
there was no service on one of the defendants. One of
the defendants moved the court to set the judgment aside.
This motion was overruled, and the defendant appealed.
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manded the case with the instructions that the defendant be given leave to file his answer and to try the case
upon the issues made, and, if found for him, to set the
judgment aside; otherwise, to permit it to remain in
force. The court, in the course of its opinion and after
referring to the statutes cited supra, said:
'• The court has a reasonable discretion,-a legal
discretion. But when the defendant was not
served with summons before judgment, and there
was no appearance in fact, the statute quoted gives
hin1 a year after its entry, in all such cases, to ask
leave to answer."
In the case of Liebhart v. Lawrence (1911), 40 Utah
243, 120 Pac. 215, the court held that an action in equity
to set aside a default judgment on the ground of false
statements as to defendant's residence, in the affidavit
for publication, was a permissible action and a direct attack on the judgment. The court held that the plaintiff's
deceit was sufficient ground in equity to set aside the
default judgm~nt in the suit and to permit defendant to
answer to the merits. We present that the cited cases
merely demonstrate the desire of the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah to construe the quoted provisions of
Section 104-14-4, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, to mean
that when from any cause the summons in an action has
not been personally served on the defendant, the court
may allow him to answer to the merits of the action. It
is self-evident that this alleviates any hardship on either
party.
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Appellant in his brief cites the case of Atkinson v.
Atkinson (1913}, 43 Utah 53, 134 Pac. 595, for the proposition that this section of the statute can be circumvented,
and if the judgment is void because of a defective service
of process, the defendant need not answer to the merits
in order to have the judgment set aside but may, at his
option, have the judgment vacated without answering to
the merits of the case. Respondent respectfully submits
this case does not stand for that proposition. This case
was a proceeding in equity to set aside and annul a judgment or decree of divorce. The appellant brought an action
to obtain a divorce from the respondent, who had never
lived in Utah. The service of summons in that action was
made by publication, the order for which was based upon
an affidavit which stated that the respondent was a nonresident of the State of Utah and that her last known
address was Cleveland, Ohio. This affidavit was false
and was known to be so by the appellant, inasmuch as
the respondent was a resident of Bridgeport, Connecticut. The trial court found it had obtained no jurisdiction
of the person of the respondent and that the decree of
divorce was void and the respondent was entitled to
have the same set aside and annulled. From this decision
appellant appealed. The Supreme Court upheld the decision on the ground that the court had no right as a
condition to the setting aside of the judgment to require
the respondent to submit herself to the jurisdiction of the
court for the purpose of the original action. Mr. Justice
Frick, in the course of his opinion, stated:
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* * the practice is well settled that, in order
to have the judgment set aside and the cause reopened, he ordinarily must submit himself to the
jurisdiction of the court, and n1ust also set up a
good defense to the action in the form of an affidavit or answer."

.. *

)Ir. Justice Frick went on to say, however, that
where the appellant had been guilty of fraud in inducing
the court to assume jurisdiction, a different rule would
prevail. He reasoned that under the circumstances of
the particular case, the district court was right in refusing to require the respondent to subject herself to the
jurisdiction of the court in the original action as a condition to having the decree of divorce set aside. The court,
in our opinion, based its decision in this case upon the
proposition that it was through appellant's fraud that
the court has assumed jurisdiction of the action and rendered a judgment theron. The court further assumed
that in some situations it might work a decided hardship
upon the adverse party to cause him to submit himself
to the jurisdiction of the court, which otherwise could
not get jurisdiction over him, in order to have a void
judgment set aside.
In short, we do not believe the Atkinson case can be
said to be authority for the proposition that the quoted
portion of Section 104-14-4, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, can be circumvented and nullified at the option of
the litigant. There is nothing in the record to indicate
that it would result in any hardship on the appellant
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herein to request the court to reopen the case and permit
him to answer to the merits. In the absence of such a
showing, we do not believe the Atkinson case is authority
for the position taken by appellant, and we respectfully
submit that appellant had a clear and equitable remedy
at the time he filed the motion which is the subject of this
controversy. We further submit that under the facts
and circumstances of this case, the remedy provided for
by the cited portion of Section 104-14-4 was the exclusive
remedy.

Summary
It has been the purpose of respondent in this brief
to present to this Court its position that the denial of a
restrictive motion to quash service of summons, made
after judgment, is not an appealable order, inasmuch as
said order is not a final judgment as that term is used in
the Constitution and Statutes of the State of Utah. It
has further been our purpose to demonstrate that appellant's motion was one which if granted would not have
served the ends of justice but would have defeated and
circumvented the same. We have further presented that
reason, equity and authority are unanimous in requiring
a holding that a restrictive motion to quash service of
summons, made after judgment, is not a proper or allowable motion.
The arguments in respondent's brief not directed to
the foregoing propositions have been made merely in
refutation of contentions of appellant in his brief.
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Upon the foregoing propositions, respondent maintains that the trial court ruled correctly in denying appellant's restrictive motion to quash service of summon made after judgment.
Respectfully submitted,

GRANT A. BROWN,
ALVIN I. SMITH,
GARFIELD 0. ANDERSON,
RICHARD L. BIRD, JR.,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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